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• Economics scholars and policy 
makers in recent years have 
rung alarm bells about the 
increasing threat of 
consolidation and 
concentration within industrial 
sectors
• Major concerns have risen with 
specific regard to the defense 
industry, as a small private defense 
establishment has largely 
replaced the broad mix of federal 
and civilian contractors that was at 
its height during World War II
Purpose of Evaluating Monopolies




• Key research question:
• How does consolidation in the defense industry effect the 
quality of performance outcomes? 
• Two Methods: 
• Direct connection, observing concentration’s effect on performance
• Indirect connection, observing competition’s effect on performance
Subsequent stages of research will be included in the final report examining the interrelation 
of consolidation and competition
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Research Hypotheses
• H1: Industrial concentration leads to changes in contract 
performance
• H2: Increasing (decreasing) industrial concentration 
leads to decreasing (increasing) competition
• H3: Decreasing (increasing) competition makes poor 
contract performance more (less) likely
4
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Definition of Output Variables
• Partial or Complete Terminations of Contract/Task Order
• 1.2% of contracts and task orders experience at least one partial or 
complete termination. 
• These contracts and task orders account for 5.6% of obligations in the 
dataset.
• FPDS does not differentiate between complete and partial terminations, so this can 
include both a cancelled program and a contract that was completed after being 
initially protested and reassigned.
• Ceiling Breaches
• Tracks whether the contract had a change order that increased its cost 
ceiling.
• 1.2% of contracts and task orders experience at least one partial or 
complete termination. 




Definitions of Study 
Input Variables
• Effective Competition
• 1 = contracts competed with 
multiple offers (54 percent of 
obligations)
• 0.5 = contracts competed 
receiving only 1 offer, (13 
percent of obligations)
• 0 = non-competed contracts (33 
percent of obligations)
• Note: Dataset only includes 
completed contracts and thus 
captures a higher proportion of 
shorter duration contracts and 






• A measure of consolidation in 
the defense industrial base
• Calculated by squaring the 
market share of each participant 
in a sector then summing the 
resulting numbers
• Can range from close to 0 
(perfect competition) to 10,000 
(monopoly)
• <1,500 =Competitive Marketplace
• 1,500 to 2,500 = Moderately 
Concentrated Marketplace
• >2,500 = Highly Concentrated 
Marketplace
• Mean (2,056) and dividing by its 
standard deviation (1,867)
7
Definitions of Study Input 
Variables
csis.org/diig |
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Y Axis)
8
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Definitions of Other Input Variables
• North American Industrial 
Classification Code (NAICS)
• Initial Contract Scope
• Natural Log of Initial Cost Ceiling
• Natural Log of Initial Duration
• Contract Vehicle
• Helps to define the nature of the 
contractor/customer relationship. Four 
different types of indirect delivery vehicles 
are observed.
• Single-award indefinite delivery
• Multiple-award indefinite delivery 
• Federal Supply Schedule or Government-
Wide Acquisition





• Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA)
• Contract Location
• Any International – Contracts and 
task orders with any transactions 
performed internationally = 1, 
Contracts with no international 
transactions = 0
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What is an Industrial Sector?
10
• NAICS codes are hierarchical, 
which means the shortened 
versions of the codes are 
parents of the longer version. 
For example:
• 54 Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Services
• 541330 Engineering 
Technical Services
• The HH-Index is calculated 
using the 6-digit NAICS codes.
• The intercepts for each 
individual contract is calculated 
using the 2-digit NAICS codes 
at this stage in the research.
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Results: Consolidation and 
Performance – Direct 
Relationship
• Consolidation significantly 
correlated with outcome 
measures, support for H1. 
• Consolidation positively 
correlated with prevalence of 
ceiling breaches (0.28)
• This finding supports perceptions of 
industrial consolidation as a risk
• Consolidation negatively 
correlated with contract 
terminations (-0.15)
• This may reflect a lock-in between 









(Intercept) -5.50 (0.16)* -4.75 (0.21)* 
c_HHI_lag1 -0.15 (0.02)* 0.28 (0.01)* 
cl_Ceil -0.02 (0.01) 0.64 (0.02)* 
cl_Days 0.67 (0.02)* 0.19 (0.01)* 
SIDV -1.04 (0.03)* -0.07 (0.03)* 
MIDV -0.22 (0.05)* 0.37 (0.05)* 
FSSGWAC -0.28 (0.05)* 0.16 (0.06)* 
BPABOA -0.45 (0.08)* -0.01 (0.08) 
n_Fixed 1.02 (0.09)* 0.30 (0.04)* 
b_UCA 1.64 (0.07)* 2.01 (0.07)* 
c_HHI_lag1:SIDV -0.50 (0.04)*  
c_HHI_lag1:MIDV 0.18 (0.05)*  
c_HHI_lag1:FSSGWAC 0.21 (0.05)*  
c_HHI_lag1:BPABOA -0.02 (0.11)  
c_HHI_lag1:b_UCA 0.37 (0.09)* 0.37 (0.07)* 
b_Intl  -0.27 (0.03)* 
c_HHI_lag1:cl_Ceil  -0.17 (0.01)* 
cl_Ceil:SIDV  -0.14 (0.02)* 
cl_Ceil:MIDV  -0.24 (0.03)* 
cl_Ceil:FSSGWAC  0.04 (0.04) 
cl_Ceil:BPABOA  -0.32 (0.08)* 
cl_Ceil:b_UCA  -0.39 (0.05)* 
AIC 112213.41 105872.70 
BIC 112402.46 106097.20 
Log Likelihood -56090.70 -52917.35 
Num. obs. 1000000 1000000 
Num. groups: NAICS2 24 24 
Var: NAICS2 (Intercept) 0.32 0.98 
*p < 0.05 
Statistical models 
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Results: Competition as a 
Mediating Variable
• Competition is negatively correlated with 
ceiling breaches, support for H3 (-0.25)
• This correlation is strongest with smaller 
contracts and fades as contract ceilings 
get higher
• Competition is positively correlated with 
terminations, opposing H3 (0.58)
• The coefficient for terminations is more 
than twice that of ceiling breaches
• For both consolidation and competition, 









(Intercept) -6.16 (0.10)* -5.38 (0.05)* 
n_Comp 0.58 (0.03)* -0.25 (0.03)* 
cl_Ceil -0.04 (0.01)* 0.87 (0.02)* 
cl_Days 0.83 (0.01)* 0.47 (0.01)* 
SIDV -0.58 (0.04)* 0.19 (0.03)* 
MIDV 0.01 (0.07) 1.11 (0.05)* 
FSSGWAC -0.57 (0.07)* 0.24 (0.05)* 
BPABOA 0.00 (0.09) 0.45 (0.08)* 
n_Fixed 1.42 (0.09)* 0.38 (0.04)* 
b_UCA 1.81 (0.06)* 1.94 (0.07)* 
n_Comp:SIDV -0.74 (0.05)*  
n_Comp:MIDV -0.37 (0.09)*  
n_Comp:FSSGWAC 0.20 (0.09)*  
n_Comp:BPABOA -0.74 (0.15)*  
n_Comp:b_UCA -1.96 (0.27)* -0.35 (0.14)* 
b_Intl  0.13 (0.03)* 
n_Comp:cl_Ceil  0.24 (0.02)* 
cl_Ceil:SIDV  -0.33 (0.02)* 
cl_Ceil:MIDV  -0.53 (0.03)* 
cl_Ceil:FSSGWAC  -0.18 (0.04)* 
cl_Ceil:BPABOA  -0.64 (0.08)* 
cl_Ceil:b_UCA  -0.64 (0.06)* 
AIC 115293.63 115669.09 
BIC 115482.68 115893.58 
Log Likelihood -57630.81 -57815.54 
Num. obs. 1000000 1000000 
Num. groups: NAICS2 24 24 
Var: NAICS2 (Intercept) 0.00 0.00 




• Contract/Task order vehicles have a significant 
influence on contract outcomes.
• Fixed-Price contracts have strong positive 
correlation with terminations.
• UCAs have significant negative correlations with 
both terminations and ceiling breaches, justifying 




• Competition and lower rates of 
consolidation do correlate with a lower 
risk of cost escalation
• The choice of vehicles should be 
given additional attention as a factor 
influencing contract outcomes.
• Emphasis on the complex interactions 
of policy decisions and the risk of 
unexpected results.
• Data can support the judgment and 
human capital that are needed for 
successful acquisition policy, there are 
no one-size fits all solutions.
14







• The data for this analysis is drawn from the Federal Procurement Data System 
(FPDS), a publicly-available repository of federal contracting data.
• FPDS contains data on all prime, non-classified contracts over $3,500 
awarded by the federal government.
• The complete FPDS dataset includes 8.8 million contracts in the observed 
period between 2007 and 2015. After removing approximately 13.5% of the 
dataset due to incomplete entries, a random sample of 250,000 contracts was 
taken for analysis by the study team. 
• Contract Ceilings are in current dollars, to avoid the risk of misestimating the 
spend rate of multi-year contracts.
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Empirical Approach
• Four working models are used to evaluate all 
combinations of competition and consolidation
with terminations and ceiling breaches.
• A maximum likelihood logit analysis analyzes both 
termination and ceiling breaches
• Multilevel modeling techniques capture the 
differences in expected outcomes between industrial 
sectors
Initial models do not address H2, the connection between consolidation 
and competition. The results of this hypothesis testing will be available in 
the final technical report.
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